




Ministers of Non-performance must go:

What happened to Ramaphosa's performance agreements?



Contents:

Introduction	2
Methodology	4
Main findings	5
The Ministers	7
Conclusion	8

Addendum A:

The details on the top performance areas for every minister and whether these interventions/targets were reached.

INTRODUCTION

In February this year, the DA tabled a Motion of No Confidence in terms of section 102 of the Constitution against President Ramaphosa's cabinet. The motion is set down to be debated on **30 March**.

Over the past few weeks, we have been releasing our "5 Reasons" series of statements, making the case against individual ministers in Ramaphosa's cabinet.

- From Minister Dlamini-Zuma, who has subjected the citizens of South Africa to an unnecessary State of Disaster for the past two years, with excessive and often downright draconian regulations limiting citizens' rights and freedoms;
- to Minister Mantashe in whom the Zondo Commission recommended criminal investigations;
- to Minister Cele who has made it his mission over the past year to disarm tens of thousands of law-abiding citizens.

It is clear that the members of Ramaphosa's cabinet, frankly, have proven to be entirely inept at their jobs. Many of them would be scarcely employable in the private sector – and many of them rightly belong behind bars.

In the meanwhile, nearly 7 500 children die of hunger in the country every year. Millions live in poverty, and the ANC's policies combined by Ramaphosa's ineffectual cabinet only further entrenches unemployment, housing shortages, and social ills in the country.

Performance Agreements

In May 2019, President Ramaphosa announced that he will be signing performance agreements with the members of his cabinet. He announced that their "performance will be closely monitored against specific targets" and that action will be taken where implementation is unsatisfactory.

The President repeated this promise in his State of the Nation Address in February 2020, promising that performance agreements will be signed by his ministers before the end of the month. Yet it was not until **October 2020**, more than a year after the initial announcement and eight months after the deadline he set for himself in SONA, that these agreements were finally signed.

To date, we have not seen **any minister being held accountable** in public in terms of the performance agreements they have signed. Seventeen months after the signing of these agreements, they seem to languish on the government's website seemingly unenforced and forgotten.

The agreements set targets for the members of Ramaphosa's cabinet, which can for some part be **objectively** measured. The DA has set out to determine how many of these targets have been met.

When the agreements were signed, Ramaphosa expressed the hope that these agreements will be the "cornerstone of a new culture of transparency and accountability." No performance agreement that remains **unmonitored** and **unenforced** can ever be an effective tool to hold public representatives to account.

If it is not possible for the President to hold his cabinet accountable, the DA will do this for him. It is for this reason that we have tabled our Motion of No Confidence in terms of section 102 of the Constitution.

The results of our analysis of the performance agreements, as presented in this document, makes it quite clear that South Africans can hold little faith in the members of cabinet appointed by President Ramaphosa.

**For those who sweat the technical detail.*

The DA followed a **comprehensive, objective, and quantitative** approach to analysing the performance agreements of ministers.

As mentioned before, this analysis focusses on the interventions/targets that are **quantifiable**. In the vast majority of performance agreements, this thus excludes the key performance areas of:

- Institutional oversight of the HOD and Department; and
- Political Leadership and oversight.

This approach was followed for two reasons:

1. Most performance agreements had **general**, non-specific, and uniform interventions for these two categories.
2. These targets are **qualitative** and subjective in nature. We wanted to **objectively** show the poor performance of ministers, without being portrayed as being biased.

These two areas are **important components** of a minister's functioning, but without measurable targets attached to them, it was decided to exclude these interventions from our analysis.

With the vast body of evidence showcasing ineptitude in the subjective interventions/targets we have no doubt the failure rate would have been significantly higher had we included it in our analysis. **Nonetheless, it was important for the DA to make an objective case as to why this underperforming cabinet must go.**

The analysis of each minister's performance agreements, starts with an **overview**, followed by some of the **most important interventions** or target for that minister.

MAIN FINDINGS

In total, the performance of all **28 ministers** across **27 Departments** were analysed for this report. We focussed on all measurable interventions/targets in the performance agreements.

From the **757** measurable interventions/targets, only 241 were achieved. This means a performance score of **32%**.

The top **three worst-performing ministers**, in terms of measurable targets reached, are:

- Mmamoloko Kubayi* + Senzo Mchunu* (together only achieved **8%** of targets)
- Fikile Mbalula (only achieved **16%** of targets)
- Khumbudzo Ntshavheni* + Mondli Gungubele* (both **19%** of targets)

Other noteworthy ministers who all achieved only **24%** of targets include:

- Thulas Nxesi (Employment and Labour)
- Gwede Mantashe (Mineral Resources and Energy)
- Lindiwe Sisulu (Tourism)
- Patricia de Lille (Public Works and Infrastructure)

Examples of measurable targets in which some ministers failed:

Some of Nxesi's biggest failures not preventing and fighting corruption, or to take effective measures to eliminate wasteful, fruitless. and irregular expenditure.

Minister Mantashe has failed to:

- Improve energy availability factor to ensure constant supply of electricity
- Increase reserve margin to counter loadshedding; or to
- Extend the Koeberg Nuclear Power Plant life

Addendum A contains details about the top performance areas for every minister and whether these interventions/targets were reached. Details of other measurable targets can be obtained from the addendum.

	Number	Percentage
Interventions reached	241	32%
Interventions somewhat reached	126	17%
Interventions not reached	189	25%
No information that interventions were reached	201	26%

Table 1: All measurable interventions for cabinet

With some performance agreements there are **serious concerns with the agreement itself**. Of notable concern are:

Pravin Gordhan (Public Enterprises)

This performance agreement is the shortest of all agreements and did not follow the same format as the others. It excluded elements such as:

- The fight against corruption in SOEs
- The metrics used in annual reports, namely irregular, wasteful, and fruitless expenditure

These targets are crucial to the Minister's performance, and it is worrisome that **Gordhan managed to escape accountability** in these areas. This portfolio is crucial for securing energy security and almost unthinkable that Ramaphosa is not holding the Minister to account.

Bheki Cele (Police)

On paper, Minister Cele achieved almost 56% of his measurable targets, which at first glance, looks like an accomplishment. When one delves deeper into his performance agreement, serious concerns arise, such as:

- Several targets were met simply by **submitting a report**. This is not any practical action taken.
- Some **targets don't effectively measure the intervention**. For example, increased visible policing does not include the number of boots on the ground. This is a key metric to measuring visible policing but was not included.
- Some **targets are so low** that it will automatically be met, for instance only a 7.48% reduction in levels of contact crime in the 2020/21 financial year. The figures can also potentially be skewed by Covid-19 lockdowns.
- Certain targets **simply require pilot projects**, or projects implemented in a few provinces. These basic interventions can't be indicative of actual performance of the Minister.

Noticeable, a performance agreement with **Deputy President, David Mabuza**, was not made available to the public. This is a flagrant lack of performance measurement. Once again, Ramaphosa is protecting Mabuza from accountability.

Worryingly, **201** interventions/targets (**26%** of the total) could not, despite a thorough and rigorous effort, be verified. Government's **lack of transparency and accountability** is evident in this regard.

- The Department/Minister simply did not publish a recent annual report.
- There is no data for the public to verify and keep the Ministers accountable.

The performance agreements signed between the President and members of his Cabinet were meant to be four year work plans designed to provide incremental progress in growing the economy, creating jobs, and improving service delivery.

However, the reality is that most Ministers just **copied and pasted data from their 2019 Annual Performance Plans** and placed it in their 4 year performance agreements. This means that these performance agreements stand the risk of becoming redundant before 2024, either because some of the targets have lapsed or have addressed within the 2019/2020 performance cycle.

**Ministers were appointed after agreements were signed.*

A comprehensive look:

Department	Minister	Achieved	Somewhat Achieved	Not Achieved	No info Achievement
Agriculture, Land Reform and Rural Development	Thoko Didiza	14 (33%)	5 (12%)	14 (34%)	9 (21%)
Basic Education	Angie Motshekga	14 (25%)	11 (21%)	12 (23%)	17 (31%)
Communications and Digital Technologies	Khumbudzo Ntshavheni	5 (19%)	12 (48%)	2 (7%)	7 (26%)
Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs	Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma	10 (40%)	2 (8%)	8 (32%)	5 (20%)
Defence and Military Veterans	Thandi Modise	5 (33%)	1 (7%)	7 (47%)	2 (13%)
Employment and Labour	Thulas Nxesi	12 (24%)	5 (10%)	18 (35%)	16 (31%)
Environment, Forestry and Fisheries	Barbara Creecy	7 (35%)	6 (30%)	3 (15%)	4 (20%)
Finance	Enoch Gondongwana	8 (44%)	2 (12%)	6 (33%)	2 (11%)
Health	Joe Phaalha	11 (28%)	2 (5%)	16 (41%)	10 (26%)
Higher Education, Science and Innovation	Blade Nzimande	17 (41%)	1 (2%)	13 (31%)	11 (26%)
Home Affairs	Aaron Mastoaledi	5 (38%)	2 (16%)	3 (23%)	3 (23%)
Human Settlements, water and sanitation	Mmamoloko Kubayi + Senzo Mchunu	3 (8%)	12 (31%)	10 (26%)	14 (35%)
International Relations and Cooperation	Naledi Pandor	9 (39%)	3 (13%)	7 (30%)	4 (18%)
Justice and Correctional Services	Ronald Lamola	10 (29%)	10 (29%)	4 (12%)	10 (29%)
Mineral Resources and Energy	Gwede Mantashe	8 (24%)	5 (16%)	10 (30%)	10 (30%)
Ministry in the Presidency	Mondli Gungubele	3 (19%)	5 (31%)	0 (0%)	8 (50%)
Police	Bheki Cele	15 (55%)	5 (19%)	2 (7%)	5 (19%)
Public Enterprises	Pravin Gordhan	3 (30%)	1 (10%)	5 (50%)	1 (10%)
Public Service and Administration	Ayanda Dlodlo	5 (38%)	4 (27%)	2 (14%)	3 (21%)
Public Works and Infrastructure	Patricia de Lille	6 (24%)	5 (20%)	8 (32%)	6 (24%)
Small Business Development	Stella Ndabeni-Abrahams	6 (33%)	3 (17%)	5 (28%)	4 (22%)
Social Development	Lindiwe Zulu	20 (50%)	3 (7%)	9 (23%)	8 (20%)
Sports, Arts and Culture	Nathi Mthethwa	19 (46%)	4 (10%)	6 (15%)	12 (29%)
Tourism	Lindiwe Sisulu	5 (24%)	2 (9%)	5 (24%)	9 (43%)
Trade, Industry and Competition	Ebrahim Patel	12 (52%)	4 (18%)	1 (4%)	6 (26%)
Transport	Fikile Mbalula	4 (16%)	9 (38%)	5 (21%)	6 (25%)
Women, Youth and Persons with Disabilities	Maite Nkoana-Mashabane	5 (21%)	2 (8%)	8 (33%)	9 (38%)

CONCLUSION

It is clear from this analysis that cabinet is **failing the citizens** of South Africa. With the term of office for President Ramaphosa being beyond the halfway mark, cabinet has done little to improve the lives of ordinary citizens, and lift millions out of poverty.

These performance agreements were **first announced in May 2019**, only signed in October 2020 and now in March 2022 most of the measurable targets were not reached.

For some of the targets there were not sufficient information available to even judge whether they were met or not. This shows a **clear lack of transparency and accountability**. The analysis of these agreements should be made public annually by the President, so that the public can keep cabinet accountable.

Performance agreements should be living documents that are **updated annually** according to the needs of the country. The current agreements does not adequately address the complex problems we face as a country.

In conclusion, the DA has hereby shown objectively why cabinet must go and urge all South Africans to rally behind our motion of no confidence.

Ultimately Parliament must make the brave decision to pass this motion and get rid of a cabinet that is not performing.

